Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158889
Authors: 
Scarpa, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
1988
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 46
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
This paper studies the optimal behavior of a monopolist in the presence of asymmetric information cencerning the characteristics of the good he produces.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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