Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158564
Authors: 
Li, Zheng
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2017-22
Abstract: 
Using two-player all-pay auctions, the author fully characterizes the Nash equilibrium under a discrete bidding strategy space. In particular, he shows that under the random tiebreaking rule, the cardinality of the set of Nash equilibrium depends on the parity of the reward size and a continuum of Nash equilibria exists. Additionally, when a simple favorone-sided tie-breaking rule is used, the equilibrium solution becomes independent of the reward size.
Subjects: 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium
all-pay auction
JEL: 
D44
D72
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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