Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158544
Authors: 
İnal , Hakan
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 349-360
Abstract: 
Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in lawenforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with "opposite equilibrium preferences" over enforcement levels in law enforcement models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises questions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models.
Subjects: 
Public enforcement
Equilibrium preferences
Enforcement equilibrium
Median voter theorem
Single-peaked preferences
Single-crossing property
JEL: 
D62
D7
K14
K42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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