Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158544 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 349-360
Verlag: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Median voter theorem has been used in many economic environments including law enforcement. Assumptions of the median voter theorem, however, are generally violated in lawenforcement models. Moreover, it is impossible to have agents with "opposite equilibrium preferences" over enforcement levels in law enforcement models. These limitations on the use of preferences over law enforcement raises questions about the robustness and validity of law enforcement models.
Schlagwörter: 
Public enforcement
Equilibrium preferences
Enforcement equilibrium
Median voter theorem
Single-peaked preferences
Single-crossing property
JEL: 
D62
D7
K14
K42
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