Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157379 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2017-19
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Delacroix and Shi (Pricing and signaling with frictions, Journal of Economics Theory 2013) study a model featuring buyers with unit demands and sellers with unit supplies. The sellers may produce a high- or a low-quality good. The buyers get a signal about quality but the signalling technology is quite specific; the signal is either completely revealing or uninformative. The author studies the same model with a symmetric signalling technology where high and low signals are always got with positive probability. As a consequence, whenever high-quality goods are produced also low-quality goods are produced. Instead of price posting the author studies trading by auctions. There are two equilibria, and the author quantifies the efficiency loss due to asymmetric information.
JEL: 
D8
D82
D44
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
211.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.