Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157215
Authors: 
Michel, Stephan
Romano, Alessandro
Zannini, Ugo
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series 5
Abstract: 
In this paper, we argue that the joint use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules is efficient when there are uncertainty surrounding causal investigations and regulatory myopia. As these conditions are generally met in environmental cases, we provide an explanation for the frequent coexistence of these two instruments to control activities that create a risk for the environment. Moreover, we suggest that a joint use of liability and regulation should more frequently be optimal at the European (Federal) level than at the Country (State) level.
Subjects: 
Regulation
Liability
Joint Use
Causal Uncertainty
Regulatory Myopia
Precautionary Principle
JEL: 
K13
K32
L50
Q52
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.