Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157215 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 5
Verlag: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we argue that the joint use of ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability rules is efficient when there are uncertainty surrounding causal investigations and regulatory myopia. As these conditions are generally met in environmental cases, we provide an explanation for the frequent coexistence of these two instruments to control activities that create a risk for the environment. Moreover, we suggest that a joint use of liability and regulation should more frequently be optimal at the European (Federal) level than at the Country (State) level.
Schlagwörter: 
Regulation
Liability
Joint Use
Causal Uncertainty
Regulatory Myopia
Precautionary Principle
JEL: 
K13
K32
L50
Q52
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
340.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.