Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155594
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Eichenseer, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6352
Abstract: 
From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. Our general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb-Douglas preferences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly discussed.
Subjects: 
public goods
leadership
choice of technology
climate policy
JEL: 
C72
H41
O31
Q54
Q55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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