Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/155557 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6315
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Oates and Schwab (1988) consider an economy with mobil capital and jurisdictions that suffer from local pollution. They show that welfare-maximizing jurisdictions implement the first-best, if they take prices as given and have at their disposal a capital tax and an environmental standard. Petchey (2015) claims that the efficiency result of Oates and Schwab can be extended to a large price-influencing jurisdiction. In the present note we show that the concept of Pareto efficiency cannot be applied in Petchey’s model. Next, we expand his model by a second jurisdiction and prove that Petchey’s claim is false, i.e. we show that the allocation implemented by a large price-influencing jurisdiction that sets an environmental standard and a capital tax fails to be (Pareto) efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
pollution
environmental standards
mobile capital
taxes
JEL: 
H23
H71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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