Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155244
Authors: 
Courtois, Pierre
Péreau, Jean Christophe
Tazdaït, Tarik
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 81.2001
Abstract: 
We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.
Subjects: 
Environmental negotiation
coalition
precautionary unilateral commitment
evolutionary process
JEL: 
D74
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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