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Autoren: 
Courtois, Pierre
Péreau, Jean Christophe
Tazdaït, Tarik
Datum: 
2001
Reihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro 81.2001
Zusammenfassung: 
We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.
Schlagwörter: 
Environmental negotiation
coalition
precautionary unilateral commitment
evolutionary process
JEL: 
D74
Q28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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