Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155225
Authors: 
Albano, Gian Luigi
Germano, Fabrizio
Lovo, Stefano
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 62.2001
Abstract: 
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
Subjects: 
Multi-unit auctions
ascending auctions
FCC auctions
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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