Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Grazzini, Lisa
VanYpersele, Tanguy
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro 33.1997
In this paper, we analyse tax harmonisation in the framework of two asymmetric countries, differing with respect to their capital-labour endowments. In the first part, we analyse how national fiscal policies are decided when countries play a non-cooperative game. At the Nash equilibrium, inefficiency arises because of the corresponding misallocation of resources. Some forms of fiscal policy co-ordination are then studied within the institutional framework of the European Community, where such policy reforms are decided by the unanimity rule. We show that, while the imposition of a minimum level of capital taxation cannot pass, there exist some forms of tax convergence that can be accepted.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.