Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/154797 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 33.1997
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we analyse tax harmonisation in the framework of two asymmetric countries, differing with respect to their capital-labour endowments. In the first part, we analyse how national fiscal policies are decided when countries play a non-cooperative game. At the Nash equilibrium, inefficiency arises because of the corresponding misallocation of resources. Some forms of fiscal policy co-ordination are then studied within the institutional framework of the European Community, where such policy reforms are decided by the unanimity rule. We show that, while the imposition of a minimum level of capital taxation cannot pass, there exist some forms of tax convergence that can be accepted.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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