Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150293
Authors: 
Frick, Mira
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 757-772
Abstract: 
Motivated by the literature on ``choice overload'', we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a \textit{monotone threshold representation}: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function $v$, from which the agent's choices depart in a menu-dependent manner. The severity of the departure is quantified by a threshold map $\delta$, which is monotone with respect to set inclusion. We derive an axiomatic characterization of the model, extending familiar characterizations of rational choice. We classify monotone threshold representations as a special case of Simon's theory of ``satisficing'', but as strictly more general than both Tyson's (2008) ``expansive satisficing'' model as well as Fishburn (1975) and Luce's (1956) model of choice behavior generated by a semiorder. We axiomatically characterize the difference, providing novel foundations for these models.
Subjects: 
Bounded rationality
threshold representations
satisficing
choice
revealed preference
JEL: 
D01
D11
D80
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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