Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150293
Title:

# Monotone threshold representations

Authors:
Frick, Mira
Year of Publication:
2016
Citation:
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 757-772
Abstract:
Motivated by the literature on choice overload'', we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a \textit{monotone threshold representation}: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function $v$, from which the agent's choices depart in a menu-dependent manner. The severity of the departure is quantified by a threshold map $\delta$, which is monotone with respect to set inclusion. We derive an axiomatic characterization of the model, extending familiar characterizations of rational choice. We classify monotone threshold representations as a special case of Simon's theory of satisficing'', but as strictly more general than both Tyson's (2008) expansive satisficing'' model as well as Fishburn (1975) and Luce's (1956) model of choice behavior generated by a semiorder. We axiomatically characterize the difference, providing novel foundations for these models.
Subjects:
Bounded rationality
threshold representations
satisficing
choice
revealed preference
JEL:
D01
D11
D80
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:
Creative Commons License:
Document Type:
Article
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