Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150291
Authors: 
Chatterji, Shurojit
Sen, Arunava
Zeng, Huaxia
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 711-733
Abstract: 
The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of the Gul conjecture (\citet{barbsurvey}).
Subjects: 
Random social choice functions
strategy-proofness
compromise
single-peaked preferences
JEL: 
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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