Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150282 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 411-453
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.
Subjects: 
Folk theorem
repeated games
continuous time
imperfect observability
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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