Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150275
Title:

# Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games

Authors:
Yildiz, Muhamet
Weinstein, Jonathan
Year of Publication:
2016
Citation:
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 157-185
Abstract:
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then, classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs.
Subjects:
Reputation
repeated games
commitment
JEL:
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:
Document Type:
Article
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