Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150275 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 157-185
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then, classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs.
Subjects: 
Reputation
repeated games
commitment
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.