Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150260
Authors: 
Sugaya, Takuo
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 10 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 691-717
Abstract: 
We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.
Subjects: 
Repeated games
unequal discounting
imperfect monitoring
folk theorem
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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