Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150249
Authors: 
Sandholm, William H.
Tercieux, Olivier
Oyama, Daisuke
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 10 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 243-281
Abstract: 
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated $p$-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in supermodular games, an almost globally asymptotically stable state must be an iterated $p$-dominant equilibrium. Since our selection results are for deterministic dynamics, any selected equilibrium is reached quickly; the long waiting times associated with equilibrium selection in stochastic stability models are absent.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game dynamics
almost global convergence
iterated p-dominance
equilibrium selection
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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