Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150213 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 1-40
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is actually traded, then it is efficiently traded. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down to a no-trade equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
Adverse selection
competing mechanisms
nonexclusivity
JEL: 
D43
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.