Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150209
Authors: 
Siegel, Ron
Ely, Jeffrey C.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2013 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 801-827
Abstract: 
We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker’s value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms’ interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are excluded from the hiring process.
Subjects: 
Adverse selection
unraveling
interviews
JEL: 
D02
D82
J44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.