Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150182
Authors: 
Reffgen, Alexander
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 663-688
Abstract: 
In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over $A$.
Subjects: 
Multiple public goods
strategy-proofness
voting under constraints
additive preferences
separable preferences
JEL: 
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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