Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150181 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 609-661
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to Nash implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations, show that these conditions are inconsistent with the contraction property when message spaces are one-dimensional, and then show how to use additional dimensions to achieve dynamic stability while gaining budget balance out of equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Mechanism design
implementation
stability
learning
JEL: 
C62
C72
C73
D02
D03
D51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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