Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150177
Authors: 
Mylovanov, Timofiy
Tröger, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 465-488
Abstract: 
We show that a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by an informed principal exists in a large class of environments with “generalized private values”: the agents’ payoff functions are independent of the principal’s type. The solution is an extension of Maskin and Tirole’s (1990) strong unconstrained Pareto optimum. Our main condition for existence is that given any type profile the best possible outcome for the principal is the worst possible outcome for all agents. This condition is satisfied in most market environments. We also give an example for non-existence.
Subjects: 
Informed principal
mechanism design
private values
strong unconstrained Pareto optimum
JEL: 
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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