Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150164
Authors: 
Peski, Marcin
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 25-55
Abstract: 
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected, and equilibrium strategies have a uniformly bounded past, then each period play is an approximate equilibrium of the stage game.
Subjects: 
Repeated games
anti-folk theorem
private monitoring
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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