Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150162 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 499-521
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets [Ehlers, J. of Econ. Theory 134 (2007), 537-547], vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.
Subjects: 
Matching problem
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
farsighted stability
JEL: 
C70
C78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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