Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150158
Authors: 
Sandholm, William H.
Hofbauer, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 341-377
Abstract: 
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game theory
evolutionary game dynamics
nonconvergnece
dominated strategies
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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