Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150155
Title:

Agreeing to agree

Authors:
Lehrer, Ehud
Samet, Dov
Year of Publication:
2011
Citation:
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 269-287
Abstract:
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge.
Subjects:
Agreeing theorem
common knowledge
common prior
JEL:
C70
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:
Document Type:
Article
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