Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150155 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2011 [Pages:] 269-287
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge.
Subjects: 
Agreeing theorem
common knowledge
common prior
no trade theorem
JEL: 
C70
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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