Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150154
Authors: 
Kojima, Fuhito
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 257-267
Abstract: 
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main result shows that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin, 2002), and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.
Subjects: 
Matching
stability
strategy-proofness
robust stability
acyclicity
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
J44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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