Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150131 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2010 [Pages:] 27-50
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game dynamics
ESS
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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