Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150127 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2009 [Pages:] 165-197
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation agents have moderately similar preferences reflecting varying popularity across objects. In this setting we show that the probability that the random serial dictatorship mechanism is ordinally efficient converges to zero as the number of object types becomes large. We provide results with similarly negative content for allocation problems with many objects of each type. One corollary is that ordinal efficiency is a strict refinement of ex-post efficiency at most preference profiles.
Schlagwörter: 
Allocation problem
ex-post efficiency
ordinal efficiency
probabilistic serial
random serial dictatorship
JEL: 
D6
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Dokumentart: 
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