Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150109
Authors: 
Oyama, Daisuke
Takahashi, Satoru
Hofbauer, Josef
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 3 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 155-192
Abstract: 
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity game with three players is provided where there are multiple globally accessible states for a small friction.
Subjects: 
Equilibrium selection
perfect foresight dynamics
supermodular game
strategic complementarity
stochastic dominance
potential
monotone potential
JEL: 
C72
C73
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0
Document Type: 
Article

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