Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150097 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2007 [Pages:] 203-229
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Abstract: 
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions and investigate the connections with dominant strategy implementation and robust implementation. We show that in standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist surplus-maximizing (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented.
Subjects: 
Nash implementation
robust implementation
secure implementation
strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C92
D71
D78
H41
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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