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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2006 [Pages:] 341-367
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.
Schlagwörter: 
Learning
Nash equilibrium
regret
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
D83
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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