Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150083
Authors: 
Foster, Dean P.
Young, H. Peyton
Year of Publication: 
2006
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 1 [Year:] 2006 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 341-367
Abstract: 
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.
Subjects: 
Learning
Nash equilibrium
regret
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
D83
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5
Document Type: 
Article

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