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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2016-215
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Although market-based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed, they often meet with public resistance. We argue that such resistance may be driven by a feeling of moral responsibility where citizens prefer to tackle environmental problems themselves, rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations, we show that moral responsibility induces participants to incur a sizable cost on themselves as well as on other participants. We discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies.
Schlagwörter: 
Laboratory Experiment
Moral Responsibility
Environmental Policy
Market Mechanism
Climate Change
JEL: 
C90
H23
Q53
Q54
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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