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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 132
Versionsangabe: 
January 31, 2017
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We employ a unique dataset on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending. Our findings, thus, resonate with existing theories of elite networks as rent extractive coalitions that stifle economic prosperity.
JEL: 
F34
F37
G21
G28
G33
K39
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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