Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149320
Authors: 
Quaresima, Federico
Fiorillo, Fabio
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6233
Abstract: 
This article investigates the patronage phenomenon in the italian, so called, Second Republic. In particular, the analysis argues that (ex) members of parliament are appointed to managerial boards in italian (partially) state-owned enterprises responding to political selection rationales. Indeed, direct political connections could be conceptualize as an instrument to control and reward politicians’ loyalty throughout a legislature. Especially in a majoritarian electoral system, where the interests of political parties and districts may diverge, the formers would need patronage resource to assure themselves members of parliament loyalty when casting ballots. The results of the empirical investigation suggests that parliamentarians’ loyalty does play a role in patronage appointments as well as the electoral result in the next electoral competition.
Subjects: 
SOE
patronage
political selection
exit strategy
JEL: 
D72
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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