Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/149315 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6228
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In the European Union, the creation of public debt statistics starts with member state governments’ reports. The EU’s statistical agency-Eurostat-then revises. How do these actors’ incentives shape reported numbers? Governments have incentives to take a more favourable view of often ambiguous accounting rules than Eurostat. Lower debt improves governments’ performance with domestic and external audiences. Eurostat is tasked with monitoring budgets for ‘excessive’ debts. We expect governments to present debt figures that Eurostat then revises upwards. This is more likely when governments have high debts, especially when in the eurozone, and prior to elections. Financial crises heighten the number of policies needing interpretation and both actors have more incentives to shape the numbers. We examine these propositions using Eurostat’s debt revisions. We find debts are revised upwards more for eurozone countries with higher debt levels and years with unscheduled elections. Financial stress strengthens these effects.
Schlagwörter: 
fiscal policy
European Union
financial crisis
electoral budget cycles
Eurostat
JEL: 
F34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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