Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149240
Authors: 
Camera, Gabriele
Gioffré, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper Series 162
Abstract: 
Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments
Subjects: 
cooperation
repeated games
social dilemmas
JEL: 
C6
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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