Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149114
Authors: 
Fluet, Claude
Emons, Winand
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Universität Bern, Department of Economics 16-01
Abstract: 
A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A better outcome may be implemented if the decision-maker adopts an active stance by barring one party from reporting or through cheap talk allowing coordination on a particular equilibrium.
Subjects: 
disclosure
persuasion
active judging
adversarial
inquisitorial
JEL: 
D82
K41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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