Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149008
Authors: 
Gauer, Florian
Kuzmics, Christoph
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics 551
Abstract: 
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent's preferences is bounded away from zero and one.
Subjects: 
Incomplete Information
Information Acquisition
Theory of Mind
Conflict
Imperfect Empathy
JEL: 
C72
C73
D03
D74
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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