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Autoren: 
Gauer, Florian
Kuzmics, Christoph
Datum: 
2016
Reihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 551
Zusammenfassung: 
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent's preferences is bounded away from zero and one.
Schlagwörter: 
Incomplete Information
Information Acquisition
Theory of Mind
Conflict
Imperfect Empathy
JEL: 
C72
C73
D03
D74
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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