Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/147374 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 6120
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study the role of competition for the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment in resource-based industries. The host country government is not only unable to commit not to expropriate investment ex post, but is also unable to commit to the provision of local resources. In the case of competition for local resources this dual commitment problem triggers higher investment levels and increases host country revenues, but hurts pro.ts of international investors.
Subjects: 
foreign direct investment
natural resources
hold-up problem
JEL: 
F21
F23
Q34
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.