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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2016-206
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections.
Schlagwörter: 
Collective Choice
Polls
Strategic Voting
JEL: 
C92
D02
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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