Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145871
Authors: 
Sproten, Alec
Casal, Sandro
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Experimental Economics: Agency Problems A05-V2
Abstract: 
Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.
JEL: 
C70
D02
C91
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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