Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145759
Authors: 
Rasch, Alexander
Gössl, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Collusion and Exclusionary Practices in Oligopoly E02-V2
Abstract: 
We analyze and compare the incentives to collude under different pricing schemes in a differentiated-products market where customers have elastic demand. We show that allowing firms to set two-part tariffs as opposed to linear prices facilitates collusion at maximum prices independent of the degree of differentiation. However, compared to a situation where firms can only set fixed fees that are independent of the quantity purchased, collusion at maximum prices is less sustainable with two-part tariffs. The results have important implications for competition policy where the perspective—static or dynamic—may be crucial.
JEL: 
D43
L13
L41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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