Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145640
Authors: 
Paha, Johannes
de Haas, Samuel
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2016: Demographischer Wandel - Session: Corporate Governance A11-V2
Abstract: 
This article studies the unilateral and coordinated effects of non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS). It provides a comprehensive model by integrating the established models of Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Flath (1991), Malueg (1992), and Gilo et al. (2006). It is the first to add a competition authority. The model finds that NCMS lower the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of NCMS is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
JEL: 
G34
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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