Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145037
Authors: 
Macho-Stadler, Ines
Pérez-Castrillo, David
Wettstein, David
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6002
Abstract: 
We propose the “average approach,” where the worth of a coalition is a weighted average of its worth for different partitions of the players’ set, as a unifying method to extend values for characteristic function form games. Our method allows us to extend the equal division value, the equal surplus value, the consensus value, the ë-egalitarian Shapley value, and the least-square family. For each of the first three extensions, we also provide an axiomatic characterization of a particular value for partition function form games. And for each of the last two extensions, we find a family of values that satisfy the properties.
Subjects: 
externalities
sharing the surplus
average approach
JEL: 
D62
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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